About Iran
The Constitution and Government
Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979, following the revolution.
The constitution provides for a religious leader, the Supreme Leader, appointed by an Assembly of Experts, and a President, the head of government, elected every four years for a maximum of two terms. The Supreme Leader is Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. A new president, Mr Mahmoud Ahmadi Nejad, took the oath of office in August 2005 after he won 62% of the vote in the presidential election in which there was a 60% turnout.
A 290 member Majlis, or parliament, passes legislation, which must be approved by the Guardian Council, an appointed body of clergy and legal experts. In the event that the Majlis and Guardian Council do not agree another body, the Expediency Council, determines the disputed aspects of legislation. In recent times, disputes have largely been about the extent and pace of modernisation.
The constitution guides the administration of economic and financial affairs of Iran and envisages the state, cooperative and private sectors of the economy. The private sector is growing. About a quarter of the private sector is controlled by religious charitable foundations, first established in 1980 to supervise the deposed Shah’s assets.
The government programme has been one of reform: greater openness and accountability of government, individual freedom under the law and more press freedom. The Third Five-Year Plan (2000–2004) aimed to reduce the government role in the economy by, for example, allowing private investment in certain sectors such as mining and financial services. The environment for foreign investors was improved when the Law for Promotion and Protection of Foreign Investments was passed in June 2002. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (2005-2009) has ambitious targets for the development of the energy and minerals sectors, the renovation and modernisation of Iranian industry and the development of non-oil exports.
The Government
Heads
• Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader
• Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, President
• Ali Larijani, Speaker of Majlis
• Sadeq Larijani, Head of the Judiciary Branch
• Ahmad Jannati, Secretary of the Guardian Council
• Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council and Chairman of the Assembly of Experts
Vice Presidents
• Mohammad Reza Rahimi, First Vice President
• Ali Akbar Salehi, Vice President and Head of National Atomic Energy Organization
• Mehrdad Bazrpash, Vice President and Head of National Organization for Youth
• Masoud Zaribafan, Vice President and Head of Foundation for Martyrs and Veterans Affairs
• Fatemeh Javadi, Vice President and Head of Environmental Protection Organization
• Mansour Borghei, Vice President Management and Planning
• Hamid Baghaei, Vice President and Head of Cultural Heritage and Tourism Organization
• Ali Saeedlou, Vice President and Head of National Sports Organization
• Mohammad-Reza Taj-oldini, Vice President for Legal and Parliamentary Affairs
Council of Ministers
• Sadeq Khalilian, Minister of Agricultural Jihad
• Mehdi Ghazanfari, Minister of Commerce
• Reza Taqipour, Minister of Communication and Information Technology
• Mohammad Abbasi, Minister of Cooperatives
• Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini, Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance
• Ahmad Vahidi, Minister of Defense and Logistics
• Hossein Samsami, Minister of Economy and Finance Affairs
• Hamid-Reza Haji Babaee, Minister of Education
• Majid Namjoo, Minister of Energy
• Manouchehr Mottaki, Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Marzieh Vahid Dastjerdi, Minister of Health and Medical Education
• Abdolreza Sheikholeslami, Minister of Housing and Urban Development
• Aliakbar Mehrabian, Minister of Industries and Mines Supervisor
• Heyder Moslehi, Minister of Intelligence
• Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, Minister of Interior
• Morteza Bakhtiari, Minister of Justice
• Ali Nikzad, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs
• Masoud Mir Kazemi, Minister of Petroleum
• Hamid Behbahani, Minister of Roads and Transportation
• Kamran Daneshjoo, Minister of Science, Research, and Technology
• Sadeq Mahsouli, Minister of Welfare and Social Security
Other members of cabinet
• Mahmoud Bahmani, Governor of Central Bank
• Nasrin Soltankhah, Director of Center for Women and Family Participation Affairs
Other
• Mohammad Hassan Aboutorabi-Fard, First Deputy Speaker of Majlis
• Esmail Ahmadi Moghaddam, Commander of Police
• Hasan Qashqavi, Spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
• Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Second Deputy Speaker of Majlis
• Mehdi Chamran, Chairman of the City Council of Tehran
• Ali Akbar Soltanieh, Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency
• Saeed Jalili, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council
• Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mayor of Tehran
Iran - Key Economic Data
GDP US$331.8 billion 2009 CIA
GDP growth 0.5% 2009 EIU
Population 74.2 million 2009 EIU
GDP per head US$4,840 2009 EIU
CPI 15.0% 2009 EIU
Unemployment 11.8% 2009 CIA
Budget Revenue US$ 97.71 billion 2009 CIA
Budget Expenditure US$84.78 billion 2009 CIA
Public Debt 19.4% of GDP 2009 CIA
Oil proven reserves 137.6 billion brls 2010 EIA
Iran/World proven reserves 10% 2010 EIA
Oil Production 3,770 2009 EIU
Oil Exports 53,534.2 2009 EIA
Natural gas proven reserves 28.08 trillion cu ft 2009 EIA
Exports fob US$70.0 billion 2009EIA
Oil exports US$2.719 million bbl/day 2009 CIA
Gas exports US$4.246 billion cu m 2008 CIA
Imports fob US$57.2 billion 2009e CIA
Trade balance US$12.8 billion 2009e CIA
Current Account balance US$2.4 billion 2009e CIA
Current Account balance as % GDP 0.7% 2009e EIU
UK Exports to Iran £400.3 million 2007 UKTI
Iranian Exports to UK £66.4 million 2007 UKTI
Foreign Exchange Reserves US$ 81.31 billion end 2009 CIA
External Debt US$18.79 billion end 2009 CIA
Import cover 15 months 2006 BMI
Exchange Rate IRR/US$ 9,928 2009 EIU
EIU – Economist Intelligence Unit
IG – Iran Government
FT – Financial Times
CBI - Central Bank of Iran
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
EIA – Energy Information Administration, US Department of Energy
UKTI – UK Trade & Investment
BMI – Business Monitor International
Oil, Gas, Mines and Minerals
Oil
Iran relies heavily on oil exports. About 75% of export income derives from the sale of oil and half the government budget is represented by oil sales. Oil income has grown rapidly in recent years from US$32 billion in 2004 to US$50 billion in 2006. The development of the sector is constrained by US sanctions which prohibit American companies from developments in the oil sector.
The Ministry of Petroleum (MoP), which has overall responsibility for the energy sector, has four autonomous subsidiaries reporting to it:
• National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for oil and gas exploration, production and oil transport.
• National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) for gathering treating, processing, transmission, distribution and export of gas and gas liquids.
• National Iranian Petrochemical Company (NPC) for petrochemical production, distribution and exports.
• National Iranian oil Refining and Distribution Company (NIORDC)
Other national oil sector companies include:
• National Iranian Offshore oil Company (IOOC) manages offshore oil fields in the Persian Gulf.
• National Iranian South Oil Fields Company (NIOC South) manages onshore oilfields in southern Iran.
• Pars Oil and gas Company (POGC) is responsible for offshore North and South Pars gas fields.
• Khazar Exploration & Production Company is responsible for the Caspian Sea developments.
• National Iranian Tanker Company (NITC) manages Iran’s tanker fleet.
Iran has 132.5 billion barrels of proven oil reserves - that is about 10% of world proven reserves. The majority of the reserves are in huge onshore fields in Khuzestan province in south west Iran.
There are 40 producing fields – 27 onshore and 13 offshore – producing generally medium sulphur crude. Although, in 1974, production was 6 million bbl/d, total production now is about 4.1 million bbl/d, about 5% of world production, although sustainable production is thought to be 3.8 million bbl/d. Domestic consumption, which is growing rapidly, is some 1.5 million bbl/d. The target is to increase production to 4.6 million bbl/d by 2010.
Existing fields, which have natural decline rates of 8% onshore and 10% offshore, need upgrading and enhanced oil recovery techniques (EOR) are needed. Current recovery rates are about 25%, compared with a world average of 35%. Iran also needs to increase the search for new oil and 17 blocks have been tendered. Sufficient investment could significantly increase capacity.
60% of exports go to OECD countries.
Regional priorities have led to a programme of oil swaps. Caspian oil (mainly from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan) is delivered to northern Iran, through the port of Neka, and Iranian oil is exported through Persian Gulf terminals. In 2006, swaps amounted to over 120,000 bbl/d; 40,000 bbl/d going to Tehran and the balance to Tebriz. The present pipeline capacity to Tehran is 180,000 bbl/d and there are plans to approximately double then triple this. In 2005, an Iran/Iraq MoU envisaged swap arrangements and the construction of a 24 mile, 350,000 bbl/d oil pipe line from Basra to the Abadan refinery. The swap would be Iraqi oil for Iranian refined products; also Iraq could export oil through Kharg Island and import refined products through Bandar Mahshahr. The difficulties with this agreement relate to the inability of Abadan to refine significant quantities of Basrah Light and the shortfall in Iran’s domestic gasoline supplies.
Exports are through four main terminals: Kharg Island (the largest), Lavan Island, Sirri Island and Ras Bahregan. Refined products are exported through Abadan and Bandar Mahshahr. The damage to these terminals in the war with Iraq has been fully repaired.
Through NITC, Iran operates OPEC’s largest tanker fleet, some 29 vessels, including Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs).
NIOC’s onshore field development concentrates on sustaining output levels from large ageing fields through EOR projects: over half or Iran’s oil production comes from fields which are more than 40 years old.
The Azadegan field, the largest discovery for many years, was made in 1999: it is estimated to have 26 billion barrels of crude. In 2004, Inpex of Japan was given a 75% stake in concession for its US$2 billion development: the stake was reduced to 10% two years later for lack of progress. Iran expects to start production at 20,000 bbl/d in 2007, which is planned to increase to 260,000 bbl/d by 2012.
In 2001 NIOC discovered a similarly large field, called Dasht-e-Abadan. Other NIOC discoveries include Darkhovin onshore filed, near Abadan, which is being developed by ENI through a US$1 billion buy-back contract. ENI started pumping 55,000 bbl/d in 2005 and expects to have reached 160,000 bbl/d by the end of 2007.
Another discovery is the Anaran field in Western Iran which was discovered by Norsk Hydro: it contains reserves of 2 billion barrels. It could produce more than 10,000 bbl/d of oil starting in 2010, although development is complicated by the need to clear mines. Lukoil is a minority partner.
Yet another large development prospect is the Yardavaran field, which has reserves of up to 17 billion barrels. It is to be developed with foreign partners: Sinopec (51%) and OVL of India (20%).
The largest crude oil storage facility is at Kharg Island with a capacity of 12 million barrels, where an expansion programme to 22 million barrels has begun. There are a number of smaller storage tanks around the country.
The Iranian constitution prohibits the granting of petroleum rights through concessions or direct equity basis to foreign companies, but permits foreign involvement through Buyback contracts.
Buybacks are arrangements by which the foreign entity funds field investments and is remunerated in the form of an allocated production share. Field operations are returned to NIOC after a stipulated number of years, at which point the contract is terminated. The first major Buybacks became operational in 1998 and 1999 for the Sirri A and E fields, where Total is the operator. Total and ENI were operators of two other fields, Doroud and Balal. Some NIOC subsidiaries have been awarded Buyback contracts. Cepsa and OMV withdrew from the Cheshmeh-Khosh contract because of disagreement over development costs and Buyback terms.
Buyback has disadvantages for both sides. NIOC bears the risk if oil prices are low, because it must sell more oil to meet the agreed rates of return (usually between 15-18%) for developers. The developers have no guarantee that they will be permitted to develop and operate discoveries and the short terms of the contracts are consider unfavourable. In recent years the term of contracts has been increased somewhat, but no significant reform of the system has occurred.
Foreign involvement in the development of the oil sector has reduced and slowed since 2006 as a result of the extraterritorial effects of US sanctions law on non-American oil and financial sector companies.
The bulk of off-shore production is in Doroud 1&2, Salman, Abuzar, Foroozan and Sirri fields; all of which are being extended. Since 2002 Shell has been developing the Soroush-Nowruz field, near Kharg Island, with estimated recoverable reserves of 1 billion barrels of heavy oil. Difficult to market, some of this oil is blended with South Pars condensate for domestic consumption.
The Caspian Sea represents a potential for off-shore development, but no agreement has been reached between the littoral states. Iran wants either the sea to be used in common or it to be divided equally: the other states favour an equidistant method of dividing the seabed, which would give Iran 12% of the Sea.
Iran has a combined refinery capacity of 1.64 million bbl/d: major refineries are located at, Abadan, Isfahan, Bandar Abbas, Tehran, Arak and Tabriz. Iran plans to expand refinery capacity to 2.54 million bbl/d by 2010 because of the strong growth in gasoline demand. Expanded facilities will allow refining of heavy crudes typical Iran’s production.
Gasoline has been importing refined products since 1982, but presently imports around a third of requirements. Gasoline is heavily subsidised by government and demand has grown strongly over many years. In June 2007, gasoline rationing was introduced to contain the subsidy. The introduction was chaotic with technical difficulties and no arrangements for the supply of excess requirements: rioting and petrol station burning occurred.
Natural Gas
Iran has an estimated 970 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven natural gas reserves – the world’s second largest reserves after Russia. 62% of reserves are in non-associated fields and have not been developed: the major fields are, South Pars (by far the largest with 280-500 Tcf), North Pars and Kangan-Nar. Iran has stopped drilling in the Dorra natural gas field as a result of a border dispute with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.
In 2005, had marketed production of 3.5 Tcf and consumed 3.6 Tcf of gas. Natural gas accounts for almost half of Iran’s total domestic energy consumption. However the price of gas is controlled and subsidized to residential and industrial consumers. Although domestic demand is growing rapidly, Iran has the potential to be a significant exporter.
Iran’s largest energy project is the development of the South Pars natural gas field, which was first discovered in 1988 and is an extension of Qatar’s 900 Tcf North Field. In addition to gas the field contains some 17 billion barrels of liquid reserves. The MoP estimates that earnings from South Pars could be as much as US$11 billion per year over 30 years. Although it has attracted some US$15 billion of investment interest, development has been delayed by technical matters (high sulphur content), contractual negotiations (controversy over Buyback terms) and international politics (the nuclear dispute). By 2006 Phases 1-5 were on-stream producing 3.2 Bcf/d of natural gas. A further five phases are due on-stream in 2007 with combined output of 10 Bcf/d. The government aims for 16 Phases to be on-stream by 2010 in order to keep pace with Qatari exploitation, which could run down the reserve base. Development of the various phases could allow marketed natural gas targets of 28.2 Bcf/d to be reached by 2010. One use for production will be reinjection.
Presently South Pars condensate production is 200,000 bbl/d and is forecast to be 500,000 bbl/d by 2010. One forecast estimates that by 2015, 1 million bbl/d will be produced from South Pars Phases 1-14.
The South Pars development plan is phased as follows.
Phase 1. Developed by Petropars, came on-stream in 2004, it produces 900 Mmcf/d of natural gas for domestic consumption, plus 45,000 bbl/d of condensate.
Phase 2 & 3. Developed by a Total-led consortium at a cost of approximately US$2 billion, came on stream in 2002, it produces 2.8 Bcf/d of gas (carried by undersea pipeline to Asaluyeh), plus 80,000 bbl/d of condensate.
Phase 4 & 5. Developed by Eni and Petropars at a cost of US$1.9 billion (including onshore treatment facilities at Bandar Asaluyeh), came on-stream in 2004 and expected to produce 2 Bcf/d of natural gas, 80,000 bbl/d of condensate, plus ethane, sulphur, LPG and petrochemicals.
Phases 6 & 8. Developed by Petropars and Statoil at accost of some US$2.7 billion, came on-stream in 2007, expected to produce 3.9 Bcf/d of gas and 150,000 of condensate. Completion was delayed because of platform and pipeline construction delays.
Phases 9 & 10. Being developed by LG Engineering and Construction Corp (South Korea) was expected to come on-stream in 2007 (but is now some one and a half years behind schedule) and to supply 2 Bcf/d of natural gas and 80,000 bbl/d of condensates. In June MoP contracted IRGC to build the IGAT-7 pipeline, which will take Phases 9 & 10 gas from the field to Assaluyeh, Iranshahr and beyond
Phase 11. In 2004 Total was selected to enter final negotiations on the US$1.2 billion project intended to produce 2 Bcf/d of natural gas and 80,000 bbl/d of condensates for LNG export on a Buyback contract. CNPC and ONGC are interested in a share of the project.
Phase 12. In 2006 Petropars was awarded the development contract. The structure has 3 Bcf/d of total production for domestic use and 2 Bcf/d for a potential LNG and 120,000 bbl/d of condensate.
Phase 13. In 2005 a Buyback contract was signed with Royal Dutch Shell (with Repsol as consortium partner) for 2 Bcf/d of gas for LNG export. Following preliminary work, the final investment decision has still to be made.
Phase 14. This is intended to be a gas-to-liquids (GTL) project in which Shell and Statoil have expressed interest.
Phases 15 & 16. To be developed by Gorb, an Iranian engineering company, at an estimated cost of some US$2 billion with the expectation of producing 2 Bcf/d of natural gas for domestic use, 133 Mcf/d for LNG export and 80,000 bbl/d of condensate.
Phases 17 & 18. Expect to produce 2 Bcf/d of natural gas for domestic use. A service contact has been awarded to three Iranian companies: IDRO (43%), OIEC (25%) and IOEC (32%). The Economy Council has agreed that the Oil Surplus Fund can be used to fund the project.
Phases 19 -22. Tenders have been released. Estimated output is some 3.5 Bcf/d of natural gas for domestic use. Costs are estimated to be in the region of US$3 billion.
Since 2006 the US Administration has renewed efforts to obtain compliance from foreign oil and financial sector companies with US sanctions legislation. This has led foreign companies to withdraw from South Pars developments or to delay further investment and foreign finance to become unavailable. Iran has turned more to its own resources preferring Iranian investors and engineering companies and to moot the establishment of a Pars Investment Fund for the sale of US$3.5 billion of Participation Bonds to fund South pars developments.
Furthermore there is strong competition for LNG customers. Other suppliers, for example Oman, Qatar and UAE, are ahead in contracting with Far Eastern buyers. Also US sanctions limit Iran to non-US liquefaction technology furthermore presently Iran has no LNG facilities.
However potential customers for Iran’s natural gas include: Ukraine, Europe, Bahrain, India, Pakistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea and China. Exports could be either by pipeline or LNG tanker with possible LNG export terminals at Asaluyeh or Kish.
In 2002, Iran and Turkey inaugurated a pipeline link between the two countries. Exports of Iranian gas are planned to reach 960 Bcf/d by the end of 2007 although there have been interruptions in supply and there are doubts that Turkish demand will grow quickly enough to absorb such an amount as it has purchase commitments with Russia, Algeria and Nigeria in addition.
Iran would like to use the Turkish pipeline to sell gas to Europe and Turkey would like a joint marketing company for this purpose. However there are number of options for the pipeline route beyond Turkey, with difficult issues to resolve.
One of the routes for the pipeline to Europe could have come as result of the signature of a MoU between Austria’s OMV and NIGC, in January 2004, regarding the proposed US$5 billion Nabucco natural gas pipeline through Turkey to Austria, bypassing Russia. Subsequent discussions were held with gas companies in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey and Hungary. However an agreement signed in 2006 between Gazprom and MOL, the Hungarian party to Nabucco, for the supply of Russian gas to Europe and another agreement with OMV looks to have undermined Nabucco.
In 2007 the Iran- Armenia pipeline came on-stream for the sale of 1.3 Tcf of natural gas to Armenia over 20 years.
In October 2004, Iran signed a U$100 billion 25 year contract with Sinopec for the production and export of LNG to China. In 2007, Petro China signed an agreement with NIGC for purchase of 3million tonnes of LNG over 25 years starting in 2011.
Agreement between India, Pakistan and Iran looks nearer on the US$3 billion 25 year IPI pipeline for the export of gas to India through Pakistan, because political tensions between India and Pakistan have eased and reportedly a gas price ofUS$5.46 million BTUs has been agreed. This price is lower than the existing price paid by Turkey to Iran and other international prices.
Natural gas is also imported from Turkmenistan by pipeline to satisfy the needs of northern Iran.
Mines & Minerals
Iran has huge (in the top ten in the world), largely untapped, mineral resources in: lead, copper, gold, manganese, uranium, chromium, antimony, tin, mica, alum, marble, turquoise, and emeralds. Also fireclay, chalk, lime, gypsum, ochre and kaolin are produced. Mining is largely Iranian owned, but some joint ventures with foreign companies are proceeding, for example, in gold mining.
The Ministry of Industries and Mines is responsible for the development of the industiry in Iran and the main state affiliate for doing this is Iranian Mines and Mining Industries and Mines (BIM), which provides funds for the development of the sector. The Geological Survey of Iran (GSI) is responsible for surveying the country for the exploration and evaluation of mineral resources (excluding hydrocarbons).
Iran's economic policies are undertaken in the context of hte 4th Five Year Economic, Social and Cultural Development Plan (March 2005 - March 2010). The growth rate in the 4th Plan is 8%.
Manufacturing and Mining grew faster (11%) druing the 3rd plan than the economy as a whole (which grew at 8%). Between 1997 and 2005, manufacturing and mining exports grew from US$ 1.6 billion to US$4.6 billion, an annual growth rate of 16% and a better performance than expected in the 3rd Plan.
Mines in Iran produce a very wide range of output, including: Coal, Lead, Zinc, Copper, Phosphate, Industrial Clay, Salt, Dolomite and Manganese. The majority of mines are located in Khorasan, Kerman, Esfahan and West Azerbaijan.
Investors need to go through a procedure to establish themselves and to begin mining; this includes obtaining an Establishment Licence and an Investment Licence. If the SMC's problem is becoming established I could look into the procedure in more detail, if they explain where they are in the process.
Useful Links: www.min.gov.ir and www.iranmining.com
Financial and Legal
Privatisation has begun in banking. There are four private banks, although they have a small proportion of banking sector assets at present. In due course it is anticipated that foreign banks will be able to open branches in Iran. Growth of the Tehran stock exchange will improve the flexibility and extent of company ownership. Leading British-based legal firms have connections with Iranian firms. In December 2004, Iran’s credit rating was upgraded (by Fitch ratings) to BB minus, with the outlook on long-term rating as Stable; this improves Iran’s access to the international capital markets. Export Credit Agencies have a generally favourable view of Iran: Britain’s ECGD took the lead taking greater risk on companies in Iran’s energy sector. Limited recourse project finance is increasingly sought from foreign participants in the economy.
Manufacturing
Steel, vehicles, household goods and textiles, cement, other construction materials, metal fabricating and food processing (notably sugar refining and vegetable oil production) are the main manufacturing sectors.
Vehicle production is a large element of manufacturing, about 20 percent, with sales of US$ 6 billion and is largely based around Tehran, Mashad and Tabriz, along with most of component manufactures. The government, through agencies of the Ministry Mines and Industry, has the largest shareholding in the vehicle sector, although foreign joint ventures have been of increasing importance. The vehicle sector could provide increasing exports to the immediate region.
Telecommunications and IT
Telecommunications attracts much attention in Iran and has much growth potential. Presently both mobile and terrestrial telephony are government monopolies. It is envisaged that mobile franchises will be sold to foreign companies but the first sale, to a Turkish company, is stalled at present.
A committee of BICC Members in the IT/telecoms industry is being formed to promote trade between the UK and Iran in this sector
Power
It is intended that the restructuring of the power sector will rely on the private sector. The growth plans for the economy indicate the growth of electricity consumption at 7-8 per cent per annum over 10 years; installed capacity intended to be 47,500 MW by 2010. Local and foreign private sector construction, investment and financing is sought to build and operate a number of new plants.
Water and Waste Water
Foreign investment and expertise are required for the water and waste water industries.
Calendar Year
The Iranian year relates to the Prophet Mohammed’s flight from Mecca. So the Iranian year is the Gregorian year less 621: the year 2010 is the Iranian year 1389. The government’s fiscal year starts on 21st March.
Working Week
The working week is Saturday to Thursday morning. Ministries are closed on Thursday. Normal working hours for government offices are 8am to 2pm. Banking hours are generally, Saturday to Wednesday, 7.30am to 1.30pm. Thursday working hours are 7.30am to 12.30pm. Generally shops and bazaars are open 8.30am to 8.30pm, except on Friday.
Business Etiquette
In public, a hand-shake is normal in greetings between men or between women but never between men and women. Social conversation is desirable before business discussions begin. Tea and cakes or fruit should be taken when offered in meetings, but should be declined in the unlikely event that it is offered during Ramadan.
The Official Holidays at the British Embassy, Tehran 2010
The following public and privilege holidays will be observed in 2010:
Sunday, 3 January
In lieu of New Year’s Day
Sunday, 14 February
In lieu of Prophet Mohammad’s death
Sunday, 21 March
Noruz
Monday, 22 March
Noruz
Sunday, 4 April
Easter Sunday & in lieu of Sizde Bedar (Nature Day)
Sunday, 2 May
in lieu of May Day Bank Holiday
Thursday, 10 June
Queen’s Birthday
Sunday, 9 July
Eve of the Prophet’s call to mission
Thursday, 29 August
In lieu of August Bank Holiday
Sunday, 12 September
In lieu of Eid-e Fetr
Sunday, 3 October
In lieu of Martyrdom of Emam Sadegh
Thursday, 18 November
In lieu of Eid-e Ghorban
Thursday, 16 December
Ashura
Sunday, 26 December
In lieu of Christmas Day
Official Holidays for 2009
IRANIAN OFFICIAL HOLIDAYS IN 2009
Tuesday 6th January
Tassoua
Wednesday 7th January
Ashura
Tuesday 10th February
Anniversary of Islamic Revolution Victory
Monday 16th February
Arbaeen
Tuesday 24th February
Prophet Mohammad’s Death and Imam Hassan’s Martyrdom
Thursday 26th February
Martyrdom of Imam Reza
Sunday 15th March
Prophet Mohammad’s and Imam Sadegh’s Births
Thursday 19th March
Oil Industry Nationalisation Day
Saturday 21st March
Noruz
Sunday 22nd March
Noruz
Monday 23rd March
Noruz
Tuesday 24th March
Noruz
Wednesday 1st April
Islamic Republic Day
Thursday 2nd April
13th Day of Noruz (Nature Day)
Thursday 28th May
Martyrdom of Hazrat Fatemeh
Thursday 4th June
Imam Khomeini’s Death
Friday 5th June
15th Khordad Uprising
Monday 6th July
Imam Ali’s birth
Monday 20th
Prophet Mohammad’s Call to Mission
Friday 7th August
12th Imam’s Birth
Friday 11th September
Martyrdom of Imam Ali
Sunday 20th September
Eid ul- Fitr (End of Ramadhan)
Wednesday 14th October
Martyrdom of Imam Sadegh
Saturday 28th November
Eid ul-Adha (Eid Ghorban)
Sunday 6th December
Eid Ghadir Khom
Saturday 26th December 2009
Tassoua
Sunday 27 December 2009
Ashura